General Hood's Performance During the Atlanta Campaign

John S. Carter

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#61
Let us just say that as a division commander he was good ;however , as a corp commander,be nice,he was adequete.The old saying about people reaching their level of incompetence,that is what happened with Hood as corp.He and his Texans were able to accomplish their orders .Franklin was worse than Pickett"s Charge,at least Lee only did it once.Davis may have made a terrible decsion in replacing Johnson with Hood.Question; how did Davis git on Stone Mountain in Atlanta,GA? If you want to read a good account on the battle ;War Like the Thunderbolt,the battle for Atlanta" can not remember author.One of the best
 

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#62
Let us just say that as a division commander he was good ;however , as a corp commander,be nice,he was adequete.The old saying about people reaching their level of incompetence,that is what happened with Hood as corp.He and his Texans were able to accomplish their orders .Franklin was worse than Pickett"s Charge,at least Lee only did it once.Davis may have made a terrible decsion in replacing Johnson with Hood.Question; how did Davis git on Stone Mountain in Atlanta,GA? If you want to read a good account on the battle ;War Like the Thunderbolt,the battle for Atlanta" can not remember author.One of the best
Franklin was Hood's only frontal assault too. A desperate gamble and his last chance to engage Schofield's army before it joined Thomas at Nashville.
 

John S. Carter

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#64
Yet more armchair psychiatry...
Are you making the statement that Hood was a successful corp commander?That would be like saying that the first generals that Lee fought were the best that the North had.Forrest nor Chapman had any respect for him. By this time of war the South had more man to throw into an fronttal attack.The question we ask to Lee at Gettesburg is one we can ask of Hood ,why did you not go around or least try to avoid a frontal assult?Sometimes a general should take into consideration his staff.READ THE BOOK.
 

John S. Carter

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#65
Yet more armchair psychiatry...
By this time there was the South was limited to resourses ,mostly of men.The question that is asked of Lee at Gettesburg should be ask of Hood why did not develope a more successful plan .Why send men into a frontal assault ,when there is a better approach. ?Longstreet was correct,Chapman was correct,and any first sargent would know the outcome.A desperate gamble is foolish gamble when you are sending men into a fortified position, it turns into a meat processor.GLORY is not worth doing this. Bonapart's method had proven disfunctional when you are going against a force who has modern weapons Not a armchair psychiary ,just one who reads.McArthur in the Phillipians plan was to island hope there by saving lives and shorting the war.No desperate frontal attacks!Qestion; Did Lee or Longstreet send picketts out ot survey the terrain?
 
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#66
Are you making the statement that Hood was a successful corp commander?That would be like saying that the first generals that Lee fought were the best that the North had.Forrest nor Chapman had any respect for him. By this time of war the South had more man to throw into an fronttal attack.The question we ask to Lee at Gettesburg is one we can ask of Hood ,why did you not go around or least try to avoid a frontal assult?Sometimes a general should take into consideration his staff.READ THE BOOK.
I've read multiple books and original documents sir, as I am a budding researcher and historian. My comment was your offhand remark that Hood had a mental problem that manifested at Franklin. I get annoyed when people attempt medical diagnoses 150 years after the fact without examining the patient. It is conjecture at best and bad history.

Hood was not even really a mediocre corps commander as his tenure with the Army of Tennessee demonstrates; his one battlefield success at Chickamauga was short-lived (and combined with a not so good performance the day before on September 19). He lost the Cherokee Battery and he was unable to cancel Stewart's flanking attack in time at Resaca, and his assault at Kolb's Farm was needless and uncoordinated.

The truth of the matter is that Hood had just tried a flanking maneuver the night before at Franklin. It had failed spectacularly thanks to staff issues and a number of normally aggressive commanders showing caution at an unexpected time. Of the two infantry corps and the cavalry on hand, all had been a part of that failed flanking maneuver (including *Cheatham). Hood might have attempted a maneuver with S.D. Lee's corps, but that corps was not going to be up until nightfall and had only two divisions of decent combat strength. Now Schofield was crossing a river, protected by the guns of Fort Granger (which would impede a flanking maneuver) and with the Fourth Corps across the river. Hood considered a flanking proposal by Forrest and rejected it as impractical because he did not have enough time, manuever space, or strength to successfully interpose a force between Schofield and Thomas. The last chance to do that had been at Spring Hill. So Hood took a gamble that attacking Schofield at Franklin would work better than attacking Thomas's whole fortified army at Nashville (which was much stronger than Franklin). It was a bloody failure. But that is unfortunately war.
 
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gunny

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#67
I've read multiple books and original documents sir, as I am a budding researcher and historian. My comment was your offhand remark that Hood had a mental problem that manifested at Franklin. I get annoyed when people attempt medical diagnoses 150 years after the fact without examining the patient. It is conjecture at best and bad history.

Hood was not even really a mediocre corps commander as his tenure with the Army of Tennessee demonstrates; his one battlefield success at Chickamauga was short-lived (and combined with a not so good performance the day before on September 19). He lost the Cherokee Battery and he was unable to cancel Stewart's flanking attack in time at Resaca, and his assault at Kolb's Farm was needless and uncoordinated.

The truth of the matter is that Hood had just tried a flanking maneuver the night before at Franklin. It had failed spectacularly thanks to staff issues and a number of normally aggressive commanders showing caution at an unexpected time. Of the two infantry corps and the cavalry on hand, all hand been a part of that failed flanking maneuver (including *Cheatham). Hood might have attempted a maneuver with S.D. Lee's corps, but that corps was not going to be up until nightfall and had only two divisions of decent combat strength. Now Schofield was crossing a river, protected by the guns of Fort Granger (which would impede a flanking maneuver) and with the Fourth Corps across the river. Hood considered a flanking proposal by Forrest and rejected it as impractical because he did not have enough time, manuever, or strength to successfully interpose a force between Schofield and Thomas. The last chance to that had been at Spring Hill. So Hood took a gamble that attacking Schofield at Franklin would work better than attacking Thomas's whole fortified army at Nashville (which was much stronger than Franklin). It was a bloody failure. But that is unfortunately war.
Quite well put over-all sir!
 

John S. Carter

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#68
I've read multiple books and original documents sir, as I am a budding researcher and historian. My comment was your offhand remark that Hood had a mental problem that manifested at Franklin. I get annoyed when people attempt medical diagnoses 150 years after the fact without examining the patient. It is conjecture at best and bad history.

Hood was not even really a mediocre corps commander as his tenure with the Army of Tennessee demonstrates; his one battlefield success at Chickamauga was short-lived (and combined with a not so good performance the day before on September 19). He lost the Cherokee Battery and he was unable to cancel Stewart's flanking attack in time at Resaca, and his assault at Kolb's Farm was needless and uncoordinated.

The truth of the matter is that Hood had just tried a flanking maneuver the night before at Franklin. It had failed spectacularly thanks to staff issues and a number of normally aggressive commanders showing caution at an unexpected time. Of the two infantry corps and the cavalry on hand, all had been a part of that failed flanking maneuver (including *Cheatham). Hood might have attempted a maneuver with S.D. Lee's corps, but that corps was not going to be up until nightfall and had only two divisions of decent combat strength. Now Schofield was crossing a river, protected by the guns of Fort Granger (which would impede a flanking maneuver) and with the Fourth Corps across the river. Hood considered a flanking proposal by Forrest and rejected it as impractical because he did not have enough time, manuever space, or strength to successfully interpose a force between Schofield and Thomas. The last chance to do that had been at Spring Hill. So Hood took a gamble that attacking Schofield at Franklin would work better than attacking Thomas's whole fortified army at Nashville (which was much stronger than Franklin). It was a bloody failure. But that is unfortunately war.
Thank you for this infomation,I think that certain people who write history of the war seek goats to explain the Confedercy's loss,as Longstreet in Pa.If you can provide me with books that are not tanted with such ,I would appreciate it.
 

John S. Carter

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#69
I've read multiple books and original documents sir, as I am a budding researcher and historian. My comment was your offhand remark that Hood had a mental problem that manifested at Franklin. I get annoyed when people attempt medical diagnoses 150 years after the fact without examining the patient. It is conjecture at best and bad history.

Hood was not even really a mediocre corps commander as his tenure with the Army of Tennessee demonstrates; his one battlefield success at Chickamauga was short-lived (and combined with a not so good performance the day before on September 19). He lost the Cherokee Battery and he was unable to cancel Stewart's flanking attack in time at Resaca, and his assault at Kolb's Farm was needless and uncoordinated.

The truth of the matter is that Hood had just tried a flanking maneuver the night before at Franklin. It had failed spectacularly thanks to staff issues and a number of normally aggressive commanders showing caution at an unexpected time. Of the two infantry corps and the cavalry on hand, all had been a part of that failed flanking maneuver (including *Cheatham). Hood might have attempted a maneuver with S.D. Lee's corps, but that corps was not going to be up until nightfall and had only two divisions of decent combat strength. Now Schofield was crossing a river, protected by the guns of Fort Granger (which would impede a flanking maneuver) and with the Fourth Corps across the river. Hood considered a flanking proposal by Forrest and rejected it as impractical because he did not have enough time, manuever space, or strength to successfully interpose a force between Schofield and Thomas. The last chance to do that had been at Spring Hill. So Hood took a gamble that attacking Schofield at Franklin would work better than attacking Thomas's whole fortified army at Nashville (which was much stronger than Franklin). It was a bloody failure. But that is unfortunately war.
 

John S. Carter

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#70
Thank you for your information. Southern historians somehow try to explain the reasons for the Confedercey loss.Either they look at certain events during a battle or they fault the command .It seems J.HOOD is a prime goat..just as Longstreet in Pa.. I would like to know of any authors and books that deal with Hood in a objective manner.Have you read "John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independece."? can not remeber author.
 
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#71
Thank you for your information. Southern historians somehow try to explain the reasons for the Confedercey loss.Either they look at certain events during a battle or they fault the command .It seems J.HOOD is a prime goat..just as Longstreet in Pa.. I would like to know of any authors and books that deal with Hood in a objective manner.Have you read "John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independece."? can not remeber author.
Richard McMurray's biography is fair, though a bit dated. Brian Miller also has a study of Hood's leadership and historiography. However, both of these works were written and published before the discovery of the Hood papers, which alters thing significantly. Hood's cousin, Stephen Hood, has written a defense of Hood and has also made most of those papers available to the public here.
 

BillO

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Quinton, VA.
#72
Thank you for your information. Southern historians somehow try to explain the reasons for the Confedercey loss.Either they look at certain events during a battle or they fault the command .It seems J.HOOD is a prime goat..just as Longstreet in Pa.. I would like to know of any authors and books that deal with Hood in a objective manner.Have you read "John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independece."? can not remeber author.
Neither lived up to their promise. Perhaps Lee, Forrest, Jackson Taylor and a few others set the bar impossibly high but in the end they both were found lacking that something that separates the okay from the great.
 

John S. Carter

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#74
Not to mention Sherman, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Twenty-Third Corps (a.k.a. the "Army of the Ohio").
Can we say that this correct.But no one will admit that the real goat is Davis.He was total inept at his position.He allowed himself to believe all the fables about Hood.Hood was a good division commander .But even Lee recommended that Davis not appoint him to the Army of Ten. along with other officer who had served under Hood.JBH campaigned for that post.If a person is known to be qualified for a position why would he himseff do such?Davis who really want to be in command position should have just assumed the command himself.{SARACAUM} It is really simple , by the time that Sherman was in front of Atlanta all of the Confederat resources were spent.No matter who was in Atlanta,even Lee,there was not any why to stop this force from addvancing.Just as Grant was to do with Lee at Petersburg,Sherman was about to do with him.The Romans could not stop the barbarians from crossing the Rhine,and the Europe could not stop the Turks from taking Constantiople.A force with one purpose can and will not cease till that objective is accomplished,esp. when the opposing force has in its mind already surrendered What they must is to pray that Devine Destinty will entervene on their behalf.Like Davis did.as he proceeded to run from Richmond.
 
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#75
Can we say that this correct.But no one will admit that the real goat is Davis.He was total inept at his position.He allowed himself to believe all the fables about Hood.Hood was a good division commander .But even Lee recommended that Davis not appoint him to the Army of Ten. along with other officer who had served under Hood.JBH campaigned for that post.If a person is known to be qualified for a position why would he himseff do such?Davis who really want to be in command position should have just assumed the command himself.{SARACAUM} It is really simple , by the time that Sherman was in front of Atlanta all of the Confederat resources were spent.No matter who was in Atlanta,even Lee,there was not any why to stop this force from addvancing.Just as Grant was to do with Lee at Petersburg,Sherman was about to do with him.The Romans could not stop the barbarians from crossing the Rhine,and the Europe could not stop the Turks from taking Constantiople.A force with one purpose can and will not cease till that objective is accomplished,esp. when the opposing force has in its mind already surrendered What they must is to pray that Devine Destinty will entervene on their behalf.Like Davis did.as he proceeded to run from Richmond.
While Davis can be criticized for his decisions as commander-in-chief, he was under both political and military considerations. War are not fought under entirely tactical and military considerations. If Clausewitz is right and war is just an extension of politics, then Davis was probably right to fire Johnston, who seemed about to abandon Atlanta without a fight. This was politically unfeasible to Davis.

Lee did no such thing. Davis asked him what he thought about the situation. Lee responded in two communications, a telegram and a letter. He essentially stated that he regretted a change in commanders when the Army of Tennessee was facing a major battle and that Hood while a good combat officer who was careless off the battlefield, this was not a negative endorsement.
 

Nytram01

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#76
...Lee did no such thing. Davis asked him what he thought about the situation. Lee responded in two communications, a telegram and a letter. He essentially stated that he regretted a change in commanders when the Army of Tennessee was facing a major battle and that Hood while a good combat officer who was careless off the battlefield, this was not a negative endorsement.
Personally, I feel Lee was hedging his bets and didn't really want to be in a position where he was responsible for choosing a replacement for Johnston.

He said Hood was an industrious fighter but was careless off the battlefield however he hadn't had the opportunity to assess his other qualities, then also said Hardee was a more experianced at high command and managing an army.

Lee had commanded Hood and knew his qualities better than he knew Hardee's who he'd never worked with closely during the Civil War, but he knew Hardee had commanded at a higher level and managed troops on a larger scale.

He didn't say one or the other would be better, he just gave a vague assessment of the two and left it up to Davis. Cant blame him for that, but I dont think his comments should be given any real weight in considering the pros or cons of either man relative to the circumstances in Georgia in 1864.
 



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